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Abstract
Using a nationally representative longitudinal survey of lawyers in the U.S., we doc-
ument a sizeable gap between men and women in their early aspirations to become law
firm partners, despite similar early investments and educational characteristics. This
aspiration gap can explain a large part of the gender promotion gap that is observed
later. We propose a model to understand the role of aspirations and then empirically
test its predictions. We show that aspirations create incentives to exert effort and
are correlated with expectations of success and the preference for becoming a partner.
We further show that aspirations are affected by early work experiences—facing harass-
ment or demeaning comments early in the career affects long-term promotion outcomes
mediated via aspirations. Our research highlights the importance of accounting for,
and managing, career aspirations as an early intervention to close gender career gaps.
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1 Introduction
Professional gender gaps are persistent, despite the strong efforts in recent years to close
them. While a large share of academic and popular attention has focused on the existence
of gender wage gaps, gender differentials persist in many other professional dimensions. In
particular, there exist sizeable gender promotion gaps. For instance, among S&P500 compa-
nies, women account for only 5% of CEOs, 21% of board members, and 26% of managers.1
In other professions, women account for 20% of law firm partners;2 and 32% of university
professors.3 Naturally, wage gaps and promotion gaps are highly linked — a promotion
is often accompanied by an increase in pay. However, the consequences of promotion are
broader than simply monetary. For instance, promotions often represent a change in status
and power within an organization.
In this paper, we highlight the importance of early career aspirations in explaining gender
promotion gaps. We study this in the context of the legal profession in the U.S., using a
nationally representative sample of U.S. lawyers who are tracked along their professional
careers. We document that among those lawyers who enter private law, when asked early
in their career, there is a sizeable difference between men and women in their aspirations to
become a partner. While approximately 60% of male lawyers have high career aspirations,
this is the case for only 32% of female lawyers. This aspiration gap helps explain a large
fraction (approximately 50%) of the gender promotion gap in the profession – a gap that
cannot be explained by a detailed set of entry-level characteristics, which are broadly similar
across men and women.
We propose a formal model to understand the role played by aspirations on career out-
comes and empirically test its predictions. Aspirations are understood as a kink in the
utility function or, in other words, a goal that, if surpassed, will provide additional utility.
We show, theoretically and empirically, that aspirations provide incentives to exert effort
and are correlated with expectations of success. We also show that aspirations are not fixed
but can be shaped by early work experiences. These experiences include mentoring and,
more important, discrimination – such that facing harassment or demeaning comments (by
virtue of one’s gender) early in the career decreases aspirations. This effect of discrimination
can have important consequences in terms of promotion since, as our theory suggests, this
implies an amplification mechanism that occurs when aspirations are strategically set.
1Catalyst, Women CEOs of the S&P500 (2017)
2A current Glance at Women in the Law, American Bar Association (2016)
3National Center for Education Statistics, IPEDS Data Center, Fall Staff 2015 Survey (2016)
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The legal profession is particularly well suited to understanding the determinants of
promotion gaps for several reasons. First, like many other highly skilled professions, it
exhibits persistent gender promotion gaps, but unlike many other professions, promotion to
partner in the legal profession is well defined and has a similar structure across firms, with
the division between partners and non-partners summarizing most of the relevant hierarchy
in a firm. Second, the legal profession traditionally evaluates performance using measures
that are transparent and homogeneous across firms (hours billed) and effort measures (hours
worked). Third, in recent years, male and female lawyers entering private law firms after law
school completion are similar on most observable variables (for instance, performing equally
well in law school, equally entering top law school programs, similarly obtaining positions
in leading law firms), which raises the question of why promotion gaps remain among the
younger cohorts.
Using a nationally representative cohort of lawyers who are tracked over twelve years
from law school completion, we begin by documenting a significant gender gap in promotions.
Twelve years after joining a law firm, women are 13% less likely to become partners than
men. This is a sizeable gap when we consider that there is gender equality at the entry
level into the partnership track and that the unconditional probability for men to become
partners is 52.9%. The gender promotion gap is virtually unaffected when controlling for
other pre-existing demographic, as well as educational and firm, characteristics, consistent
with the finding that these characteristics, when entering the law profession, are very similar
between men and women for a given cohort.
This gender gap in promotion echoes a different gap between men and women in terms
of aspirations. We document that, when asked early in their careers about their aspiration
to eventually make partner on a scale from one to ten, while 60% of men report having high
career aspirations (eight or more) to become partners, only 32% of women report similar
aspirations. Similarly, while only 13% of men have low career aspirations (three or less), this
is the case for 31% of women. These gender differences in career aspirations explain up to
50% of the gender promotion gap. The gender promotion gap is, therefore, partly driven by
a different distribution of aspirations between men and women. However, we show that for
a given level of aspirations, men and women have the same chances of promotion – in other
words, a female lawyer with high career aspirations has the same chance of being promoted
as a male lawyer. An important question, therefore, is why aspiration levels differ between
men and women.
To understand the role of aspirations and the mechanisms behind it, we set out an
analytical framework to specify testable implications. Aspirations can be described as the
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desire to reach an attainable goal. Consistent with this definition, following Genicot and Ray
(2017), we define aspirations as a threshold. If the realized outcome crosses the threshold,
the individual obtains an additional payoff, increasing the distance between the outcome and
the goal. Using this concept of aspirations, we analyze a three-period model. In the first
period (early career), aspirations are determined, either exogenously by the environment
or endogenously by the lawyer. In the second period (mid-career), the lawyer chooses how
much effort to exert. In the final period (later career), promotions are determined.
The model offers three main predictions. First, under broad conditions, aspirations
and effort are positively correlated. Higher aspirations create incentives to exert effort to
benefit from the additional payoff. Second, higher aspirations should be positively correlated
with expectations of success for two reasons: i) higher aspirations generate higher levels of
effort, such that the lawyer can rationally expect higher odds of success, and ii) the lawyer
strategically sets the aspirations level as a commitment device to incentivize effort – higher
chances of success will encourage her to set aspirations higher. Finally, the third prediction
is that aspirations are positively correlated with the intrinsic preference for being a lawyer.
This is because stronger preferences increase the benefits of using aspirations to encourage
effort.
The model also offers insight into how the effect of early work experiences on promo-
tions can be amplified when aspirations are endogenously set as a commitment device. The
direct effect of experiences on aspirations influences effort by, for instance, increasing its
cost. This in turn feeds back into aspirations being set at a lower level, given the lower
benefits of commitment. Moreover, the endogenous setting of aspirations makes the tradi-
tional classification of supply-side and demand-side drivers of gender gaps less useful. While
aspirations are, strictly speaking, part of the preferences of the lawyer (supply side), they
are also sensitive to the workplace environment (demand side).
We empirically explore these predictions in the data. First, we show that higher early
career aspirations increase early “inputs” that determine promotion, as described in the an-
alytical model by effort. In particular, high aspirations of becoming a partner are associated
with higher effort and personal investment. High-aspiring individuals work longer (regular
and weekend) hours, bill more hours, and are less likely to switch firms in their early or mid
career. Aspirations also affect other choices, such as the choice of the number of children.
We show that women in our sample have an 8% higher likelihood than men of not having
children. Moreover, aspirations significantly predict a higher likelihood of having children
in the future for male lawyers, while they are uncorrelated in the case of women. This
endogenous choice highlights a different effect of children on professional success between
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genders. However, conditional on this choice, fertility differences do not explain the gender
promotion gap. These results allow us to better understand the channels through which
aspirations impact later promotion. Second, career aspirations are also closely connected to
the self-reported probability of becoming a partner in a law firm (i.e., the expectation to
become a partner). However, aspirations are generally a better predictor of later promotion
and contain information that predicts becoming a partner over and above these correspond-
ing self-reported probabilities. Finally, aspirations contain a marked preferences component
and are higher among those individuals who report higher levels of satisfaction with being a
lawyer at early (and later) stages of their careers.
This first set of results highlights that aspirations summarize a large share of the relevant
information about the desire and the commitment to become a partner at a law firm. The
gender difference in aspirations after joining a law firm explains approximately half of the
later gender promotion gap. This seems at odds with the balanced distribution of charac-
teristics of men and women when joining the firm, and it suggests that the aspiration to
become a partner may be changing differentially during the early professional lives of men
and women. Although aspirations may reflect some pre-existing unobservable differences in
preferences, it is important to determine whether early workplace experiences in the labor
market shape promotion aspirations.
In the last part of the paper, we focus on the impact of early employment-related ex-
periences on aspirations. The role of early experiences — of discrimination -– within the
profession has received little attention in the literature. It is plausible that early experiences
can shape career aspirations. There are various forms of discrimination, which we classify
as “organizational” and “social” discrimination. Organizational discrimination, in its sim-
plest form, would assign different pay for the same work. In the case of lawyers, it could
also be attributed to a senior partner assigning a differential case load assignment to some
(equivalently able) lawyers compared with others on the basis of other characteristics, such
as gender. Social discrimination, on the other hand, can be thought of as the interaction
with colleagues and the corporate culture of the firm. It is often difficult to measure and
categorize. It may, for instance, include experiencing harassment and derogatory comments
by virtue of one’s characteristics. It might also be reflected, more generally, in the workplace
environment. Finally, since junior lawyers are often assigned mentors at an early stage in
their careers, we additionally investigate the importance of role models and, in particular,
the importance of their level of seniority and gender.
We explore both organizational and social forms of discrimination. We find little evi-
dence that promotions are influenced by explicit or implicit organizational discrimination in
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pay, tasks or case assignment. We do, however, find that social discrimination matters, in
particular, experiencing demeaning comments or other types of harassment. Among young
lawyers, 25% of the women in our sample experience social discrimination early in their
careers, compared with only approximately 5% of men. We show that early experiences of
discrimination by colleagues strongly affect one’s career aspiration to become a partner and,
ultimately, are linked to actual future promotion outcomes. We show that these comments
are unrelated to the ex ante characteristics of the lawyer targeted but are, indeed, negative
shocks that affect aspirations. This is a central result, as it shows that small changes in
one’s labor market experiences can have strong and persistent effects, particularly due to
the amplification effect mentioned above.
Our paper contributes to a growing literature that studies the underrepresentation of
women in senior high-skilled positions, frequently referred to as the glass ceiling (e.g.,
Bertrand and Hallock, 2001; Bertrand et al., 2019). While there is growing literature on
gender gaps in wages and the dynamics of the gender wage gap among the high-skilled
(Manning and Swaffield, 2008; Bertrand, Goldin and Katz, 2010; Azmat and Ferrer, 2017),
there has been relatively less focus on promotion (see Altonji and Blank, 1999, and Bertrand,
2011, for reviews of the literature). The two are highly linked; however, promotion entails
a broader set of implications beyond pay. While studies have shown that women are pro-
moted less than men (Cobb-Clark, 2001; Blau and DeVaro, 2007), recent studies by Bosquet,
Combes and Garcia-Pen˜alosa (2018) and Hospido, Laeven and Lamo (2019) find a gender
gap in promotion that is no longer significant when accounting for gender differences in pro-
motion seeking. Our study documents a gender gap in promotion that is largely explained
by differences in career aspirations, suggesting a mechanism for differential promotion seek-
ing. Studies have shown that the presence of children can be an important obstacle for
career progression (see, for instance, Bertrand, 2013). In our study, while men with higher
career aspirations are more likely to have children, this effect is absent for women, suggest-
ing that the trade-off between children and career aspirations is more negative for women.
Goldin and Rouse (2000) show that gender-based discrimination may also impact promotion
decisions. Focusing on early employment experiences, including both organizational and so-
cial discrimination, we find that experiencing harassment or derogatory comments by virtue
of one’s characteristics has an important impact on career aspirations and, subsequently,
promotion.
Our study focuses on a cohort of similar individuals simultaneously starting homogeneous
jobs. Moreover, both the definition of promotion and the procedure to achieve it are well
defined within the profession. We observe detailed information on initial conditions (e.g.,
educational background and proxies for ability) and lawyers’ on-the-job performance, and
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we follow each individual in their new position for ten years – including if they decide to
leave private law or the legal profession completely. While the findings are highly relevant
for other high-skilled professions and sectors, the structure allows us to overcome issues
that arise when more broadly examining a population of individuals who can be affected by
composition effects and by the lack of comparability of promotions across roles and industries.
Our paper also relates to the theoretical literature of aspiration formation (Ray, 1998;
Ray, 2006; Genicot and Ray, 2017) and adaption (Simon, 1957; Selten, 1998; Karandilur et
al., 1998), which highlights, mostly in the context of poverty traps, the importance of aspira-
tion gaps. Several studies have empirically examined the effect of educational interventions
on the educational aspirations of children from disadvantaged backgrounds (Heckman et al.,
2013; Guyon and Hulliary, 2019; and Rizzica, 2019). Recent work by Azmat and Kaufmann
(2019) evaluates the importance of one’s environment on adapting educational aspirations
and the links between these aspirations and later educational choices. In our study, we elicit
aspirations in a very different context of high-achieving young professionals, focusing on gen-
der differences in aspirations. Similar to the existing literature on poverty and education,
our results suggest that early interventions in the workplace (either driven by firm policies
or public programs) could have a large and long-lasting impact in narrowing gender gaps in
promotion.
Our paper highlights the key role played by the aspirations gap. The analysis of aspira-
tions is important not only insofar as they are a good way to aggregate information about
individuals’ preferences, expectations and goals but also because they can be influenced and
shaped. Policies that shape aspirations (e.g., in education, public perception or internal firm
policies) can have a persistent influence on promotion gaps. What aspirations capture, and
how they are formed, is key to understanding the “glass ceiling”. Moreover, if policy can
affect aspirations, it is a good early signal that policy will potentially be effective.
2 Institutional Setting and Data Description
The legal profession is among the highest-paid professions in the U.S., along with physicians
and CEOs (National Cross-Industry wage estimates, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics), and
it constitutes a substantial share of U.S. GDP. Legal expenses account for more than 200
billion dollars, which constituted 1.5% of U.S. GDP (Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S.
Department of Commerce, 2008).
There was a dramatic expansion of the legal profession in the 1980s that attracted a large
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number of women into the profession. Women now comprise 50% of law graduates, compared
with only 22% in 1980. On entry into the labor market, they constitute approximately 45% of
large law firms’ associates. Associate lawyers are employees of the firm with the prospect of
becoming a partner – they enter the partnership track. Law firm partners are joint owners
and business directors of the legal operation. As such, partners share the risks and the
decision making of the firm and expect to have, on average, higher earnings than salaried
lawyers. Partners also have higher levels of responsibility and are expected to manage the
firm and bring business to it. The process of making partner is highly prestigious and often
very competitive. In many firms, the associate-to-partner ratios are approximately 2:1. The
“up or out policy” is one in which associates who do not make partner are often required to
resign from the firm.
As in many high-skilled professions, there is a growing concern about gender earnings
and promotion gaps in the legal profession. The gender earnings gap among lawyers per-
sists at approximately 33% (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016), with little progress observed
over the past two decades. In terms of promotion, across cohorts, currently only 20% of
partners are female. However, although these gaps are smaller when we restrict attention
to those who graduated in an era with gender equality in law school graduation (as in our
data), we continue to observe important and persistent gaps. Within our sample, men have
an approximately 13% higher likelihood than women of making partner twelve years after
graduation.
Our analysis is conducted using data from After the JD, a nationally representative,
longitudinal survey of lawyers in the U.S. The After the JD study is a project of the American
Bar Foundation and other legal associations. Lawyers in the sample are representative of all
lawyers first admitted to the bar in the year 2000 and are subsequently followed at five-year
intervals. At entry, participants are primarily employed in private practice (54%), as well
as in government jobs and nonprofit organizations (25%), private industries other than law
firms (18%), and academic institutions (3%). We primarily focus on those who enter into
private law, since these are the lawyers who will follow the “partnership track”. We can,
however, explore mobility across firms and sectors (within or out of the legal profession), as
well as movement out of the labor market (into unemployment or inactivity).
The survey was first conducted in 2002, and the same lawyers were interviewed again
in 2007 and then in 2012. 4 The data include information on relevant job characteristics,
employment history, education, family background and family status. Importantly, they also
4The response rate in 2002 was approximately 70 percent. Among those responding in 2002, more than
85 percent also responded in 2007, and in 2012, there was a response rate of approximately 80 percent.
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include objective measures of performance and hours of work (both regular and additional),
as well as detailed information on workplace experiences, career goals and perceptions, and
satisfaction. Lawyers are asked, for instance, about their career aspirations and predicted
probabilities (expectations) of “making” partner. Given the time frame, we can also observe
actual promotion to partner status by 2012.
In Table 1, we report the pre-labor-market and early-labor-market descriptive statistics
among the lawyers, separately for men and women. Overall, we find that men and women
have observably similar individual characteristics, educational achievement, and early work-
related characteristics and experiences. Female lawyers tend to be slightly younger and
less likely to be married and have considerably fewer children. With respect to educa-
tional achievement (undergraduate college, rank of law school, own rank within law school
year, amount of student debt), there is no significant difference. Similarly, with respect to
firm characteristics (size of firm, type of organization, proportion of women in the firm),
characteristics of mentors (gender, seniority), and the types of tasks (and their degree of
responsibility), there is no significant difference.
3 Gender Promotion Gaps and Links to Early Aspira-
tions
3.1 Gender Promotion gap
We begin our analysis by documenting a sizeable gender promotion gap among lawyers twelve
years after law school completion. From Column (1) of Table 2, we see that the baseline,
unconditional gender promotion gap is on the order of 12.2%, suggesting that women who
have been working in law firms have a substantially lower chance than men of making partner.
Within a cohort of lawyers on a partnership track in which close to half are women, this
suggests that among those who eventually make partner, 36% will be female, compared with
64% male.
While our focus is on individuals within the same profession and sector, carrying similar
educational requirements, there may still be heterogeneity within the profession, such that
the gap in promotions could potentially be due to ex ante differences in the characteristics
of men and women. These differences could be, for instance, the quality of the university
attended for undergraduate or law school or differences in sorting across firms. In columns
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(2) to (5) of Table 2, we control for individual characteristics, pre-labor-market educational
characteristics, and entry-level firm characteristics (Table A1 presents the full set of coeffi-
cients). In column (2), when controlling for age and race, we find that the gender promotion
gap remains on the order of 12%. When controlling for educational background (university
and law school rank, own class rank in law school, the number of job offers, the amount
of debt at law school completion) in column (3); marital status, the presence (and age) of
children in column (4); and job characteristics (size of firm, type of organization, proportion
of women at the firm, the types of tasks) in column (5), the promotion gap continues to
hold. In terms of magnitude, the gap actually increases to 13.2% after controlling for job
characteristics, suggesting that female lawyers are being matched to firms and tasks with a
higher probability of promotion.5 Throughout the rest of the paper, we include the same
broad set of controls as in column (4) in all regressions.
3.2 Links to the Aspirations Gap
Turning next to career aspirations, we document another striking gap between male and
female lawyers – the gender aspirations gap. In Figure 1, we plot lawyers’ career aspirations
by gender. When asked to rate in 2007, on a scale from 1 to 10, their aspirations to eventually
become a partner in their firm, we see that 60% of male lawyers answered 8 or higher,
compared to only 32% of female lawyers. Similarly, while 13% of men have low aspirations (3
or less), 31% of women report low aspirations. Taking this measure as a continuous outcome,
the average gap between women and men is on the order of 50%, a figure comparable to the
actual, eventual promotion gap in 2012. These graphical results are confirmed in Table 3,
which echoes the analysis for the promotion gap (Table A2 presents the full set of coefficients).
The aspiration gap is large and does not vary substantially when adding controls.
Do gender differences in career aspirations by lawyers contribute to differences in eventual
promotion? In column (2) of Table 4, we include career aspirations as a continuous variable
and in column (3) as a categorical variable in three aspiration bins (low for aspirations
between 1 and 3, medium for aspirations between 4 and 7 and high for aspirations between 8
and 10) as a determinant of promotion. We show that career aspirations explain up to 55%
of the gender promotion gap. Differences in early aspirations explain a sizeable fraction of
the gender promotion gap, reducing it by more than half to 6.2%, which is not significantly
different from zero. As aspirations increase, the likelihood of promotion increases linearly
5With respect to individual and firm characteristics, we control for entry-level characteristics, rather
than current characteristics, since decisions reflected in the current characteristics could be endogenous to
the outcome.
10
(from column (3)). Relative to the lowest aspiration group, those in the middle (highest)
aspiration group have a 16% (36%) higher likelihood of promotion.
Since by examining promotions alone, we capture whether the lawyer was eventually
promoted at any firm and not necessarily the firm where she worked when reporting her
aspirations, in Table 5, we consider promotion at the same firm or a better firm as the
dependent variable. Men and women might differ in how they revise their expectations, and
in particular, men might be more willing to seek promotion at a worse firm if unlikely to
obtain it at their current workplace. We explore this in Table 5, showing that the promotion
gap is sizeable and highly correlated with the aspirations gap. However, the gender promotion
gap is smaller, on the order of 8.5% (column (1)), suggesting that men are more likely than
women to move to a “worse” firm to be promoted. When controlling for aspirations as
a continuous variable in column (2) or as a categorical variable in column (3), the gap
falls to 2%, confirming again that the promotion gap is well explained by the aspirations
gap. Moreover, in column (4), we interact aspirations with gender, showing that there are
no significant differences between genders in the role of aspirations. This is important, as
it suggests that the gender promotion gap is largely driven by a different distribution of
aspirations between men and women and that for a given level of aspirations, men and
women have the same chances of promotion.
4 Understanding Aspirations: Analytical Framework
In the previous section, we demonstrated the existence of a substantial aspirations gap
between men and women, which helps explain the gender gap in promotions to partner. It is
important to understand what determines aspiration differences across individuals. In this
section, we provide an analytical framework that presents what aspirations measure, how
they affect outcomes, and how they are determined. The proofs are provided in Appendix
A2. In the following section, we empirically test the predictions of the model.
Aspirations can be defined as a desire to attain a feasible goal. In that spirit, a common
way to model aspirations in the literature is to define them as reference points or thresholds
(Genicot and Ray, 2017; Dalton et al., 2014) over some continuous outcome space. If the
realized outcome crosses the threshold, the individual obtains an additional payoff, increasing
in the extent to which the goal has been surpassed. This modeling strategy accords well with
the above definition of aspirations. Aspirations to achieve a given goal make the goal more
desirable, but they are only relevant if the goal can be achieved given a reasonable level of
11
effort and luck.
We adopt this framework in the model presented below. Consider a lawyer at the start
of her career, and let z ∈ (0,+∞) be a continuous realized outcome variable at promotion
time. The outcome z can be understood as the quality of the final position obtained (i.e., a
composite of being promoted or not, and, for example, at what firm and salary, the number
of shares granted, and reputation).6 Given a realization of z, the lawyer has the following
utility at promotion time:
v(z) + v (max(z − a, 0))
where a measures aspirations. The utility derived from achieving z is composed of two terms:
the direct utility v(z) and additional utility that depends on whether the goal is surpassed,
i.e., z exceeds the aspirations a. In the derivations, we assume the specific functional form
v(z) = γ (1− e−z), where γ measures the strength of preferences. This creates the kink in
utility, which we illustrate in Figure 1 where we draw the baseline utility without considering
aspirations (v(z)) and the total utility (v(z) + v (max(z − a, 0))) for two distinct levels of
aspirations.
For a given lawyer with such preferences, we consider a three-period model, where each
period can be thought of as corresponding to a different stage in the career. In the first
period, corresponding to the start of the career, aspirations are determined, either exoge-
nously (by the work environment, peers or social norms) or endogenously if the lawyer can
strategically change them. We discuss these two polar cases later in this section. In the
second period, the lawyer decides how much to work, denoted h (for hours). In the final
period, corresponding to the stage of the career when promotions are decided, the outcome
z is determined stochastically as a function of the work done by the lawyer. Specifically, z
follows an exponential distribution of parameter λ, f(z) = λe−λz, where λ is a decreasing
function of effort h.7
In this environment, we first show the following result:
Lemma 1 For a given level of effort h, the lawyer’s utility is decreasing in aspirations a.
Proof: See Appendix A2.
Higher aspirations render the additional payoff v (max(z − a, 0)) more difficult to attain.
6The model could be easily adapted to the case in which the outcome is simply being promoted or not.
7Specifically, 1λ = h at cost c(h) =
α
2 h
2.
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Figure 1: Representation of the utility function
Note: The solid black line plots the baseline utility without aspirations. The dashed line plots utility when aspirations are set
at a = 0. The dotted line plots utility when aspirations are set at a = 1. All plots are performed for γ = 2.
This property is illustrated in Figure 1, where the utility function for aspirations set at 1 is
below the utility function for aspirations set at 0 for all realizations of z. Hence, if effort is
given, lawyers would always prefer to have low aspirations. However, aspirations may still
play a role by creating incentives to exert effort. Indeed, we show in Proposition 1 below
that as long as aspirations are not excessively high, the effort (or number of hours worked)
by the lawyer is increasing in aspirations. The idea being that if aspirations set goals that
appear reasonable, they offer the promise of an additional payoff for better outcomes, and
this encourages more effort. However, the opposite is true if aspirations are too high, such
that the goal appears unrealistic and higher aspirations would discourage effort.
Proposition 1 There exists a¯ such that effort h is increasing in a if and only if a ≤ a¯.
Proof: See Appendix A2.
Proposition 1 also implies a link between aspirations and expectations, understood here
as the expected value of z. Indeed, when a ≤ a¯, increasing aspirations increases effort and,
as a consequence, increases the expected value of z.
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What if individuals can, to some extent, strategically influence their level of aspirations?
We consider this possibility in the second part of the model, where we allow the lawyer to
set her aspirations in the first period at no direct cost.8 We further assume that the lawyer
exhibits present bias. Specifically, she has beta-delta preferences, with δ = 1 and β < 1.9
According to this model, in addition to regular discounting, any payoff received in the future
will be discounted by a factor β. This model implies a time-inconsistency problem. From
the perspective of period 0, the costs of effort in period 1 and the benefits in period 2 are
both discounted by a factor β. However, when the effort decision is made in period 1, costs
are not discounted while benefits are discounted at rate β.10
In this environment, Proposition 2 presents two main results. First, if the present bias is
sufficiently large, the lawyer sets aspirations at a positive level. Moreover, the stronger the
preferences for the outcome or the higher the present bias, the higher the aspirations the
lawyer will set.
Proposition 2 When chosen by the player in period 0, there exists β¯ such that aspirations
are set strictly positive a∗ > 0 if β ≤ β¯. Furthermore, we have the following proposition:
1. effort is increasing in a∗;
2. if β ≤ β¯, aspirations a are increasing in preferences γ and decreasing in β.
Proof: See Appendix A2.
The intuition for this result is the following. If the individual is not present biased, she
will make an optimal choice of effort in the second period, and aspirations are, therefore,
initially set at their lowest level, since higher aspirations just decrease payoffs according to
Lemma 1. However, with present bias, from an ex ante perspective, the lawyer anticipates
that she will work an insufficient number of hours in period 1 because effort will involve
8There is an indirect cost of setting higher aspirations, since as shown in Lemma 1, for a given level of
effort, they decrease payoffs.
9These preferences are such that for a stream of consumption (ct, ct+1..., cT ), the utility at time t is given
by U t(ct, ct+1..., cT ) = ct + β
∑T−t
k=1 u(ct+k).
10There is a very large theoretical literature proposing models of discounting that account for behavioral
aspects of intertemporal choice. Prominent among them is the model of hyperbolic discounting (Laibson
1997, O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999, 2001), which we use in this paper. The existence of present bias has been
extensively documented in the lab (see Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2002) and more recently
in the field (DellaVigna and Malmenider, 2006, Meier and Sprenger, 2010, Augenblick et al., 2015). In
particular, Augenblick et al. (2015) document that present bias is particularly relevant for effort allocation,
which is also the object of the current paper.
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an immediate cost for a delayed benefit. Thus, for a sufficiently high level of present bias,
aspirations, even though they are indirectly costly, become useful to encourage future effort.
They serve as a commitment device used by a sophisticated agent to overcome her time-
inconsistency problem.11
Thus, naturally, aspirations will be set higher for more present biased individuals (low β),
as expressed in Proposition 2.2. The literature highlights the fact that women tend to be less
present biased than men (e.g., Coller and Williams, 1999). Wilson and Daly (2003) highlight
evidence from evolutionary psychology (specifically with regard to mating and reproductive
behavior) implying higher discount rates among males. There is similar evidence among
children, with boys being less patient (Bettinger and Slonim 2007 and Castillo et. al. 2011).
This could therefore suggest a partial explanation for the aspirations gap.
The final result of Proposition 2 shows that aspirations are increasing in γ, the utility
derived from the outcome, if β is small enough. The role of γ is a priori ambiguous. A
higher γ increases the value of commitment. However, a higher γ also increases the indirect
cost of increasing aspirations (making the kink more difficult to reach). The first effect will
dominate if the individual is very present biased.
Our analytical framework, therefore, offers three main testable results. Below, we briefly
describe them and then empirically test them in the next section:
1. Aspirations and effort are positively correlated. This is always true when aspirations
are strategically set (Proposition 2.1), as the individual would never choose aspirations
so high that they do not create incentives to exert effort. This is also the case when
aspirations are exogenously determined (Proposition 1), as long as they are not too
high.
2. Aspirations are positively correlated with expectations of success. This is for two
reasons. First, higher aspirations tend to encourage higher effort and thus increase
the expectations of success, a direct consequence of Propositions 1 and 2. Second,
if lawyers are heterogeneous in their expectations of success, a lawyer who is more
hopeful will strategically set higher expectations.
11The literature has distinguished na¨ıve individuals (unaware of their dynamic inconsistency) from so-
phisticated individuals (O’Donoghue and Rabin 2001). The latter type of person searches for commitment
devices to overcome time inconsistency. For instance, there is a literature showing that commitment devices
are effective in encouraging savings and reducing loan defaults (Ashraf et al. 2006). In a different domain,
DellaVigna and Malmenider (2006) show how gym memberships can work as a commitment to exercise, an
activity that is under-performed due to present bias. Alan and Ertac (2015) show that children also use
commitment devices. They show that there is no significant difference in the use of commitment devices
between boys and girls.
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3. Aspirations are positively correlated with preferences. That is, we should observe
higher aspirations whenever the utility that an individual enjoys from being a lawyer
is higher. We should also observe that the additional utility from becoming a partner
should also be higher the higher the aspirations are.12 This is derived in Proposition
2.
When bringing the model to the empirical evidence, we can also consider how other,
exogenous factors may also influence the level of aspirations. These factors may directly
change aspirations or, in the setting where aspirations are endogenously chosen, do so by
changing the primitives of the model (the preference for higher outcomes, a disutility of
effort, or the probability of higher outcomes). While the model does not specify what
exogenous factors may influence the level of aspirations, we briefly discuss some dimensions
that may matter. Some factors could be contextual and cultural or determined by the direct
environment of the individual. For instance, Genicot and Ray (2017) discuss how parents
affect the aspirations of their children. Similarly, Azmat and Kaufmann (2019) show how
the political environment may change the aspirations to enroll in higher education. More
broadly, Ray (2006) introduces the idea of an aspirations window as formed from similar
“attainable” individuals. In this paper, we argue that aspirations can be driven by early
work experiences and, in particular, experiences that are of a discriminatory nature.
Since aspirations can be partially set exogenously but also partially be the result of a goal-
setting strategy, this creates a reinforcing mechanism. Holding aspirations fixed, a change
in the work environment can affect the returns to a promotion and the disutility of effort,
thereby influencing effort and the probability of being promoted. However, if aspirations are
endogenously determined (i.e., as a form of goal setting), they should also react to the new
environment and expectations, thereby inducing further changes in effort and the expectation
of being promoted. Moreover, it could also be the case that the working environment may
directly affect aspirations. Overall, the dual role of aspirations as endogenously set but
influenced by external factors may entail that small differences in early work experiences
may be amplified via the aspirations channel into large differences in promotion outcomes.
5 Understanding Aspirations: Empirical Analysis
In this section, we test whether the three main predictions outlined in the analytical frame-
work empirically hold. In particular, we test i) whether aspirations correlate with the effort
12This is as a result of a higher γ and a steeper region of the utility function
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exerted by the lawyer (in Section 5.1), ii) whether aspirations correlate with expectations of
promotion (in Section 5.2), and iii) how they relate to satisfaction with being a lawyer (in
Section 5.3).
5.1 Aspirations and Effort
We first examine the links between aspirations and important labor market “inputs” in
early or mid career that are relevant in determining eventual promotion. Factors such as the
number of hours worked, the number of hours billed, and the likelihood of changing firms
early are likely to be important determinants on the promotion track. The previous section
suggested that higher aspirations should induce higher levels of such inputs, summarized in
the analytical framework as the effort exerted.
In Figure 3, we graphically show that professional aspirations closely track early inputs
(hours billed, hours worked, remaining at the same firm). By grouping aspirations into
three bins (low, medium, and high), we see that aspirations are monotonically and strongly
positively correlated with the hours worked and hours billed and negatively correlated with
the probability of changing firms. This is consistent with the notion that high aspirations
affect a lawyer’s effort, productivity and personal commitment to the firm, thus increasing
the likelihood of promotion.
This graphical evidence is confirmed in Table 6. In column (1), we show that individuals
with high aspirations work significantly more hours. The effect is large – those in the
highest aspiration group work 300 more hours per year than those in the lowest aspirations
group.13 The effect is also monotonic, with those reporting mid-level aspirations working 100
more hours than low-aspiration individuals. Similarly, individuals with higher aspirations are
significantly more likely to bill hours, as shown in column (2), an effect of similar magnitude.
There is also a large effect, visible in column (3), on the hours worked over weekends,
especially among those with the highest aspirations. Finally, higher aspirations make it less
likely that individuals will leave their current firm. Column (5) shows that all these “inputs”
contribute to promotion. We show that an increase in hours billed per week by 1 (an increase
of 2% relative to the mean) increases on average the probability of promotion by 5%. The
other measures of hours worked have less power in explaining partnership; however, there is
a strong correlation between hours billed and worked. Early moves from the firm reduce the
chances of ending up a partner by 17%.
13This represents six hours more per week, for an average work week of 50 hours.
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Apart from career choices, such as choosing hours or changing firms, aspirations might
also affect other decisions, such as the choice of having children. In Table 7, we explore
whether aspirations are linked to fertility choices.14 Column (1) shows that, on average,
female lawyers are much less likely to have children than their male counterparts, a differ-
ence on the order of 8%. Moreover, higher aspirations are correlated with having children.
This, however, conceals key gender differences that we highlight in column (2). While the
aspirations of female lawyers do not affect their choice to have children, for male lawyers,
aspirations are strongly (positively) correlated with having children. If men and women have
a similar desire for children given their level of aspirations, this implies that high-aspiration
women make an explicit effort in choosing not to have children. Columns (3) and (4) show
that having children does not affect the probability of being promoted, and this is indepen-
dent of gender. These results suggest that the gender promotion gap is not driven by fertility
choices. However, our results also show that men and women are making their fertility de-
cisions differently across aspirations, probably to offset a differential impact of children on
career progression.
The evidence presented in this section, therefore, confirms in the data the prediction that
aspirations and effort are positively correlated. Theoretically, it is only when aspirations are
exogenously determined and too high that this relationship would not hold. Thus, this
strong positive correlation can also be viewed as indirect evidence that aspirations are, at
least partially, chosen by the lawyers themselves.
5.2 Aspirations and Expectations
The second prediction of our analytical framework is that career aspirations and expectations
are linked. One of the channels, as highlighted in Section 4, is that higher aspirations
encourage higher levels of effort (as shown above) and thus induce individuals to have higher
expectations of success.
The top-left panel of Figure 4 illustrates the strong correlation between aspirations and
expectations in our data. Lawyers are asked early in their career about how they rated their
chances of making partner within their firm. The expectations, which are measured from 0
to 100%, are assigned to bins from 1 to 10. We further define low (30% or below), medium
(40% to 70% ), and high (80 % and above) expectations. Figure 4 shows that the average
reported expectation is approximately 72% for those with high aspirations, compared with
14Note that our family controls included in all regressions (married, children and children under 4 years
old) are reduced to just married for this table only
18
23% for those with low aspirations.
In Table 8, we measure how much of the gender promotion gap is explained by gender
differences in expectations. We perform the equivalent exercise to that performed in Table
4, showing that gender differences in expectations explain an important part of the gender
promotion gap. The gap falls from 13% to 9% (column (3)). However, when separately
examining aspirations (column (2)) or doing so jointly with expectations (column (4)), we
see that aspirations explain the gender promotion gap over and above the effect of the
expectations gap. In column (4), when controlling for both expectations and aspirations,
the gap falls to 5.9%, suggesting that expectations provide little additional information
to explain the promotion gap beyond that explained by differences in aspirations (where
the gap is reduced to 6.5% and not statistically significant). Overall, aspirations retain
explanatory power even when saturating the model by including expectations and a wide
array of observable characteristics.
These results suggest that the respondents may be assessing their expectation of becoming
a partner with some error or responding in a biased way.15 The response by lawyers on their
aspiration to become a lawyer seems to contain information that helps to correct these
biases. In equilibrium, if aspirations are set optimally as a self-commitment device, they
should have predictive power about future promotion outcomes. This result highlights that
tracking individual aspirations can be valuable in predicting future outcomes.
5.3 Aspirations and Preferences
The final prediction of the model is that aspirations are positively correlated with preferences
(i.e., the utility from being a lawyer), as expressed in Proposition 2. In the survey, lawyers
are asked about their satisfaction with becoming a lawyer. In Table 9, column (1), we see
that among those with the highest early aspirations, later satisfaction (in 2012) is highest. In
column (2), we show that satisfaction with the decision to become a lawyer is higher for those
who make partner. When we control for both partnership and aspirations (column (3)) and
interact partnership and aspirations (column (4)), satisfaction is highest for those who have
the highest career aspirations and actually achieve their goal. Controlling for earlier levels of
satisfaction with the decision to become a lawyer (in 2007), we see that the coefficient falls
from 0.70 to 0.48; however, the effect remains strongly significant. This echoes the findings of
the analytical framework, which suggested that individuals deriving the highest utility from
15For example, they may be answering about the possibility of being offered a partnership if they take the
necessary steps to do deserve one, even if they have decided not to work for it.
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promotion would be the ones strategically setting higher goals. The results in Table 9 also
show that the difference in satisfaction between making partner and not making partner is
monotonically increasing in aspirations.16 That is, the additional utility that lawyers enjoy
from becoming partners (10 years out) is increasing in their previous aspirations, which is
consistent with the idea of aspirations being some form of goal setting or bet with oneself.
6 Early Professional Experiences (Discrimination) and
Aspirations
In this section, we explore how early workplace experiences may affect aspirations. The
analytical framework highlights that there are two sets of factors that can determine the
level of aspirations. First, some factors can be defined as endogenous – those that influence
the strategic choice of aspirations by the agent to incentivize effort. Second, exogenous
environmental factors can also directly influence how aspirations are set. The workplace
environment could shift aspirations either because it changes the exogenous factors that
affect them (for instance, social norms or peer pressure) or because it affects the endogenous
decision about where to set aspirations (for instance, a change in expectations of success).
Given the focus of the paper on gender promotion gaps, we focus our attention on whether
aspirations are affected by early experiences of discrimination. There are various forms of
discrimination that can be measured in our data. We classify discrimination into “organiza-
tional” and “social” discrimination. Organizational (employer) discrimination, in its simplest
form, would assign different pay for the same work. Social discrimination, on the other hand,
can be thought of as the interactions with colleagues and the corporate culture of the firm.
While it is often difficult to measure and categorize discrimination, our data allow us to
study these separately. Overall, we find that while there is little evidence for organizational
discrimination affecting aspirations or promotion outcomes, social discrimination plays an
important role.
Social discrimination may come in many forms. It might be related to the workplace
environment, as well as with subtle interactions with colleagues or clients. We measure
social discriminatory experiences in 2002, five years before lawyers report their professional
aspirations and ten years before promotions are measured. Early in their careers, lawyers
16The point estimates on the utility of not making partner are also decreasing in aspirations (although
this trend is not statistically significant), suggesting some form of regret when aspirational objectives are
not met
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are asked about whether they have experienced demeaning comments or harassment in the
workplace by virtue of their demographics. By 2002, 25% of women reported having such
experiences, compared with only 6% of men. These experiences, which are gender specific,
are not driven by other characteristics of the lawyer that we observe, such as university rank
or grades (as shown in Table A3). They can be considered random negative shocks of being
paired with discriminatory colleagues.
In Table 10, we explore the effects of demeaning comments and harassment, restrict-
ing the analysis to the subset of female lawyers who are so exposed. Columns (1) and (2)
show that experiencing social discrimination leads to lower aspirations to be promoted and
a lower probability of being effectively promoted ten years after experiencing it. Moreover,
in column (3), we show that most of the effect of demeaning comments and harassment on
promotion is incorporated into the change in aspirations induced by them. That is, aspira-
tions measure well the effect of discriminatory comments on outcomes and are potentially
mediating between the two. Once we control for professional aspirations, the direct effect of
demeaning comments and harassment on promotions is not statistically significant. While
we cannot make formal claims of causality, these experiences of harassment can reasonably
be considered random adverse shocks, as they are uncorrelated with ex ante characteristics
of the lawyers (as shown in Table A1).
The importance of social discrimination experiences on aspirations and promotion, in
combination with the idea that aspirations can serve as a self-commitment device, indicates
that the determination of aspirations can amplify the effect of early discrimination experi-
ences on promotion outcomes. To illustrate this idea, one can think of a modified version
of the model in Section 4 in which workplace discrimination increases the disutility of ex-
erting effort or decreases the utility of a given promotion outcome. If a lawyer experiences
discrimination after aspirations have been set, it will directly affect promotion outcomes via
lower effort. However, if a lawyer experiences discrimination before aspirations have been
set, discrimination will affect the effort devoted to becoming a partner not only directly
but also indirectly via the setting of lower aspirations. This is an important result, as it
highlights that small interventions in the workplace that have an impact on aspirations can
have a larger long-term effect on outcomes if they are performed early on, before aspirations
are formed.
Next, we turn to measures of organizational discrimination in Table 11. We explore
various measures of potential organizational discrimination. First, we focus on the most
straightforward measure of whether male and female lawyers have a different return to the
same performance. In column (1), we show that the number of hours billed (performance)
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is positively correlated with the probability of promotion. However, there is no differential
impact by gender, suggesting that men and women are not rewarded differently for a given
hour billed in terms of promotion. Similarly, we do not see a gender differential for returns
to hours worked. That is, ceteris paribus, the promotion impact of higher productivity
seems to be the same for men and women. Second, we examine several other explicit or
implicit ways in which an employer might discriminate against a lawyer. At an early stage
in their career, junior lawyers are supervised by more senior lawyers. These senior lawyers
could potentially “interfere” with the number of hours that associate lawyers bill, such that
there could be scope for discrimination. Moreover, lawyers could receive more or fewer case
assignments at the discretion of their more senior colleagues. We investigate the importance
of case assignment for promotion and whether receiving enough assignments differs by gender.
We also investigate whether seniors “write-down” hours billed (i.e., not awarding associate
lawyers full credit for the hours that they bill) differently by gender. Overall, we do not find
gender differences in either of these measures on promotion (as shown in columns (3) to (6)).
We end this section by examining a different dimension of early work experience – the
interaction with the mentor in the firm. Junior lawyers are often assigned mentors during
the early stage of their career. In the data, we observe both the gender of the mentor and
the level of seniority. Table 12, column (1) shows that having a senior mentor is strongly
correlated with having high career aspirations. This is the case for both male and female
lawyers. Column (2) shows, however, that the mentor being a woman is not correlated with
aspirations, and this is independent of the gender of the lawyer. This suggests that there is
no strong positive evidence of having female mentors acting as role models for more junior
women. The effect of having a senior mentor is correlated with the probability of becoming
a partner, and although part of this effect could be causal, there is also the possibility that
some of this correlation is driven by positive sorting on unobservable characteristics.
Overall, the results in this section show that aspirations can be affected by early workplace
experiences and, in particular, by early experiences of social discrimination in the form of
harassment or demeaning comments by colleagues. We do not find, however, evidence of
firms engaging in organizational discrimination explaining the average gender promotion
gap in our sample.
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7 Conclusions
We show how an important fraction of the gender promotion gap in the legal profession can
be explained by different aspirations to become a partner. Men and women are largely com-
parable on observable characteristics when they join the legal profession. However, early in
their career, men report higher aspirations to become partners than women. This differential
in aspirations is linked to the gender promotion gap twelve years after entering the profes-
sion, even after controlling for a comprehensive set of firm and individual characteristics and
for self-reported probabilities of being promoted. This result highlights that understanding
aspirational gaps is important to explain the gender “glass ceiling”.
Our results suggest an important potential amplification mechanism. Small differences
in preferences or expectations may affect professional aspirations, which can then affect the
individual effort and commitment to being promoted, which can then feed back into pro-
fessional expectations or personal goals. This amplification mechanism also implies that
small changes in how firms deal with their employees very early in their careers can have
large and long-lasting effects on their performance and promotion chances. Moreover, in-
dividual aspirations retain predictive power for future actual promotions after controlling
for self-declared expectations of being promoted, suggesting that measuring aspirations can
also be an important tool to measure future outcomes and the early impact of policies or
interventions.
We show that experiences do indeed play an important role. Early discriminatory expe-
riences in the workplace can shape aspirations and have a long-term professional influence.
In particular, harassment or discriminatory experiences in the workplace measured just after
lawyers have joined the firm have an effect on later professional aspirations. This change
in professional aspirations predicts whether lawyers will be promoted ten years later. Inter-
estingly, we find that discrimination and harassment by coworkers affect aspirations, while
there is no evidence of systematic discrimination on the procedures that firms use to as-
sign cases or workloads. This result poses a challenge for the internal policies of the firms
that attempt to eliminate gender discrimination and to improve the aspirations of young
professional women. The forms of social discrimination that are more harmful to women’s
aspirations are precisely those about which information is softer and more difficult to obtain,
in contrast with organizational discrimination, for which hard information is easier to obtain
and on which firm policies are more likely to have an impact.
The channel linking aspirations to promotion could be relevant for other types of pro-
motion gaps. We show that the link between the promotion gap and aspirations can also
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be found when performing the same analysis based on race. In Table 13, we see that there
is a promotion gap of 14 % (after controlling for other characteristics) between white and
non-white lawyers. As in the case of gender, controlling for aspirations significantly decreases
the promotion gap. Although to a lesser extent than for gender, the gap is reduced by ap-
proximately one-third. Given that we also show that aspirations can be quite sensitive to
early professional experiences, this suggests that actions intended to reduce aspiration gaps
can be an important policy instrument.
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8 Tables and Figures
Figure 2: Career (Partnership) Aspirations (by gender)
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Note: The figure plots, by gender, the responses to the question: “How strongly do you aspire to attain an equity partner
position within your firm?” This is on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 10 (Very high). We restrict the data to individuals who are
observed billing at least one hour in our data. The figure compares aspirations for men and women. Aspirations are measured
on a 10-point Likert scale.
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Figure 5: Expectations by Aspiration
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Note: The figure plots, by high or low aspirations, expectations of being promoted to partner. We restrict the data to individuals
who are observed billing at least one hour over the sample period. We plot the average expectation of making law partner
across the 10 bins of aspirations.
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Table 2: Gender Promotion Gap
Promoted to Partner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female -0.122∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
Constant 0.541∗∗∗ 0.853∗∗∗ 1.351∗∗∗ 1.341∗∗∗ 0.820
(0.026) (0.163) (0.235) (0.239) (0.520)
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Family controls No No No Yes Yes
Firm controls No No No No Yes
Observations 680 679 679 679 679
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.022 0.042 0.038 0.044
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level. In all columns, the dependent variable takes value 1 if the individual made
partner by 2012 and 0 otherwise. Individual controls include Female, Age and race dummies (White (omitted
category), Black, Hispanic, Indian, Asian, Others. Education controls include Rank UG Uni., Rank Law
School, Rank in LS Class, Job Offers, and Debt after LS. Family controls include Married, Children, and
Child Aged 4. Firm controls include Share of women firm, separate dummies for Types of organization
(solo practice, private law firm, federal government, state or local government, legal services or public
defender, public interest organization, educational institution, professional service firm, other Fortune 1000
industry/service, other business/industry, labor union, trade association, others), separate dummies for Size
of firm (size of the organization, in bins, 0-5, 6-10, 11-25,25-50,51-100,101-150, 151-200, 201-250, 251-500,
501-1000, and 1000+), separate dummies for Types of tasks (for each of the following, lawyers are asked
about their involvement on a scale from 1 (None) to 5 (All): keeping the client updated, being involved in
formulating strategy, traveling to make court appearances or to meet clients, or holding face-to-face meetings
with clients, and Tenure at firm. For further definitions of the variables, see Table 1.
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Table 3: Gender Aspirations Gap
Career Aspirations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female -1.699∗∗∗ -1.642∗∗∗ -1.614∗∗∗ -1.524∗∗∗ -1.586∗∗∗
(0.245) (0.248) (0.249) (0.251) (0.254)
Constant 7.366∗∗∗ 7.402∗∗∗ 10.202∗∗∗ 10.521∗∗∗ 5.548∗
(0.164) (0.905) (1.387) (1.403) (3.218)
Individual controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Family controls No No No Yes Yes
Firm controls No No No No Yes
Observations 680 679 679 679 679
Adjusted R2 0.065 0.067 0.084 0.088 0.120
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level. Career Asp. refer to how strongly the lawyer aspires to obtain partnership. The
variable takes values from 1 to 10, where 1 represents not at all and 10 represents very high. For definitions
of the variables, see Table 2.
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Table 4: Gender Promotion Gap and Aspirations
Promoted to Partner
(1) (2) (3)
Female -0.132∗∗∗ -0.065 -0.065
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Career Asp. 0.043∗∗∗
(0.006)
Mid Aspirations 0.161∗∗∗
(0.055)
High Aspirations 0.361∗∗∗
(0.053)
Constant 0.820 0.535 0.691
(0.520) (0.493) (0.503)
Observations 679 679 679
Adjusted R2 0.044 0.109 0.114
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level. In all columns, the dependent variable takes value 1 if the individual made
partner by 2012 and 0 otherwise. Career Asp. refer to how strongly the lawyer aspires to attain partnership
within his or her firm. The variable takes values from 1 to 10, where 1 represents not at all and 10 represents
very high. Mid aspirations takes aspiration values from 3 to 7, and High aspirations takes aspiration values
of 8 or more. The omitted category is Low aspirations, which takes aspiration values of less than 3. All
columns include Individual, Education, Family and Firm controls. For definitions of the variables, see Table
2.
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Table 5: Gender Promotion Gap and Aspirations: At Same (or Better) Firm
Promoted to Partner in Same (or Better) Firm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.085∗∗ -0.023 -0.024 -0.047
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.086)
Career Asp. 0.039∗∗∗
(0.006)
Mid Aspirations 0.149∗∗∗ 0.112
(0.052) (0.082)
High Aspirations 0.327∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.075)
FemalexMid. Asp 0.064
(0.106)
FemalexHigh. Asp 0.010
(0.101)
Constant 0.340 -0.064 0.220 0.087
(0.487) (0.363) (0.473) (0.464)
Observations 679 679 679 679
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.096 0.100 0.094
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level. In all columns, the dependent variable takes value 1 if the individual is promoted
to partner by 2012 and 0 otherwise at the firm where he or she was employed in 2007 or at a firm that is
larger. All columns include Individual, Education, Family and Firm controls. For definitions of the variables,
see Tables 2 and 4.
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Table 6: Aspirations and Effort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hours Worked Hours Billed Hours Weekend Move Firm Promoted to Partner
Mid Aspirations 0.107∗ 0.088∗∗ 0.299 -0.063
(0.055) (0.038) (0.353) (0.046)
High Aspirations 0.309∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.037) (0.344) (0.045)
Hours Worked 0.003
(0.002)
Hours Billed 0.184∗∗∗
(0.055)
Hours Weekend -0.000
(0.007)
Move Firm -0.174∗∗∗
(0.043)
Constant 2.921∗∗∗ 1.957∗∗∗ 3.070 0.526 0.555
(0.568) (0.346) (3.036) (0.478) (0.499)
Observations 917 884 864 922 600
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.180 0.026 0.099 0.084
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level. Hours worked is the annual is the number of hours worked (expressed in
thousands of hours) in 2007. Hours Billed is the annual number of hours billed (expressed in thousands
of hours) in 2007. Hours worked weekends is the annual number of hours worked on weekends (expressed
in thousands of hours) in 2007. Move firm is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the individual moved
firm before 2007. Promoted Partner is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the individual made partner by
2012. All columns include Individual, Education, Family and Firm controls. All columns include Individual,
Education, Family and Firm controls. For definitions of variables, see Tables 2 and 4.
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Table 7: Aspirations and Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Children Children Promoted to Partner Promoted to Partner
Mid Aspirations 0.082∗∗ 0.108∗
(0.042) (0.065)
High Aspirations 0.068∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.059)
Female -0.078∗∗ 0.018 -0.134∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.066) (0.040) (0.057)
FemalexMid. Asp -0.024
(0.084)
FemalexHigh. Asp -0.197∗∗
(0.080)
Children -0.011 -0.041
(0.046) (0.059)
FemalexChildren 0.062
(0.079)
Constant 0.057 -0.021 1.300∗∗∗ 1.288∗∗∗
(0.358) (0.362) (0.432) (0.433)
Observations 922 922 679 679
Adjusted R2 0.266 0.272 0.046 0.045
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level. Children refers to whether the lawyer has children. Promoted Partner is
a dummy variable taking value 1 if the individual made partner by 2012. All columns include Individual,
Education, Family and Firm controls. All columns include Individual, Education, Married and Firm controls.
For definitions of variables, see Tables 2 and 4.
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Table 8: Aspirations and Expectations
Promoted to Partner
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.132∗∗∗ -0.065 -0.090∗∗ -0.059
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040)
Mid Aspirations 0.161∗∗∗ 0.102∗
(0.055) (0.057)
High Aspirations 0.361∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.060)
Mid Expectations 0.173∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗
(0.049) (0.052)
High Expectations 0.344∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.054)
Constant 0.820 0.691 0.716 0.667
(0.520) (0.503) (0.501) (0.497)
Observations 679 679 679 679
Adjusted R2 0.044 0.114 0.115 0.136
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level. In all columns, the dependent variable takes value 1 if the individual made
partner by 2012. Expectations refer to the lawyers’ perceived probability of obtaining partnership (they are
asked how they rate their chances, as a percentage ranging from 0 to 100, of attaining partnership at their
firm. We bin the responses into 10 bins). Mid expectations takes expectations values from 3 to 7, and High
expectations takes expectations values of 8 or more. The omitted category is Low expectations, which takes
expectations values of less than 3. All columns include Individual, Education, Family and Firm controls.
For definitions of the variables, see Tables 2 and 4.
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Table 9: Aspirations and Preference to be Lawyer
Preferences 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mid Aspirations 0.064 0.030 -0.031 -0.023 -0.038
(0.112) (0.116) (0.137) (0.141) (0.121)
High Aspirations 0.449∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.163 0.121 -0.163
(0.105) (0.114) (0.139) (0.148) (0.128)
Promoted to Partner 0.235∗∗∗ 0.127 -0.311 -0.321 -0.204
(0.082) (0.086) (0.223) (0.230) (0.192)
Mid Asp*Partner 0.362 0.315 0.167
(0.266) (0.274) (0.230)
High Asp*Partner 0.618∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗
(0.253) (0.261) (0.220)
Pref. 2007 0.559∗∗∗
(0.036)
Constant 2.620∗∗∗ 2.762∗∗∗ 2.627∗∗∗ 2.718∗∗∗ 4.482∗∗∗ 1.900∗∗
(0.087) (0.056) (0.093) (0.102) (1.105) (0.821)
Observations 678 657 657 657 656 626
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.011 0.033 0.039 0.047 0.337
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level.In all columns, the dependent variable Preference 2012, measures how satisfied
the respondents are with their decision to become a lawyer (on a scale from 1 to 5). All columns include
Individual, Education, Family and Firm controls. Pref. 2007 measures lawyers’ satisfaction with the decision
to become a lawyer as of 2007. For definitions of the variables, see Tables 2 and 4.
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Table 10: Social Discrimination (Female Lawyers Only)
(1) (2) (3)
Career Asp. Promoted to Partner Promoted to Partner
Comments -1.084∗∗ -0.182∗∗ -0.122
(0.538) (0.079) (0.075)
Mid Aspirations 0.270∗∗∗
(0.080)
High Aspirations 0.438∗∗∗
(0.083)
Constant 0.621 1.083 1.098
(5.331) (0.786) (0.747)
Observations 251 251 251
Adjusted R2 0.099 0.107 0.209
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level. Comments refer to whether the lawyer experienced demeaning comments or
other types of harassment in the last two years (as measured in 2002) by virtue of their race, religion,
ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation. All columns include Individual, Education, Family and
Firm controls. For definitions of the variables, see Tables 2 and 4.
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Table 11: Organizational Discrimination
Promoted to Partner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.095∗∗ -0.148 -0.123∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.186) (0.040) (0.046) (0.040) (0.043)
Hours Billed 0.208∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.067)
Hours Billed*Female 0.029
(0.099)
Not Enough Assignments -0.208∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.062)
Not Enough*Female -0.042
(0.090)
Hours Discounted -0.152∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗
(0.058) (0.076)
Hours Discounted*Female 0.062
(0.113)
Constant 0.566 0.586 0.978∗ 0.991∗ 0.872∗ 0.850
(0.523) (0.527) (0.513) (0.514) (0.517) (0.519)
Observations 641 641 679 679 679 679
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.057 0.073 0.072 0.053 0.052
Note: * denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level. Not Enough Assignments takes value 1 if the lawyer reports that not enough
assignments are the reason that why he or she had difficulty meeting billables and 0 otherwise. Partner
Discounted Hours takes value 1 if the lawyer reports that partner-discounted hours (or a lack of full credit)
is the reason that he or she had difficulty meeting billables and 0 otherwise. All columns include Individual,
Education, Family and Firm controls. For definitions of the variables, see Tables 2 and 4.
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Table 12: Role Models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Career Asp. Career Asp. Promoted to Partner Promoted to Partner
Female -1.610∗∗∗ -1.608∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.112
(0.252) (0.473) (0.040) (0.076)
Senior Mentor 1.781∗∗∗ 1.914∗∗∗ 0.127∗ 0.085
(0.436) (0.681) (0.070) (0.109)
Male Mentor 0.433 0.456 -0.029 -0.011
(0.542) (0.721) (0.087) (0.116)
Sen.Male Mentor -0.875 -1.046 0.022 0.064
(0.667) (0.954) (0.107) (0.153)
FemalexSen. Mentor -0.209 0.061
(0.883) (0.142)
FemalexMale Mentor -0.050 -0.041
(1.076) (0.173)
FemalexSen.Male Mentor 0.301 -0.062
(1.348) (0.217)
Constant 5.679∗ 5.729∗ 0.779 0.743
(3.161) (3.184) (0.508) (0.512)
Observations 679 679 679 679
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.148 0.053 0.049
Note:* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level.Senior Mentor refers to whether the lawyer’s mentor is a law firm partner. Male
Mentor refers to whether the lawyer’s mentor is male. All columns include Individual, Education, Family
and Firm controls. For definitions of the variables, see Tables 2 and 4.
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Table 13: Race Promotion Gaps
Promoted to Partner
(1) (2) (3)
White 0.140∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.105∗∗
(0.051) (0.049) (0.049)
Career Asp. 0.042∗∗∗
(0.006)
Mid Aspirations 0.152∗∗∗
(0.055)
High Aspirations 0.352∗∗∗
(0.053)
Constant 0.683 0.479 0.589
(0.519) (0.502) (0.503)
Observations 679 679 679
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.117 0.119
Note:* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level. All columns include Individual, Education, Family and Firm controls. For
definitions of the variables, see Tables 2 and 4.
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9 Appendix
Table A1: Promotion gaps
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Promoted to Partner Promoted to Partner Promoted to Partner Promoted to Partner Promoted to Partner
Female -0.122∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
Age -0.008∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.010∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Black -0.105 -0.087 -0.082 -0.093
(0.084) (0.085) (0.086) (0.090)
Hispanic -0.177∗∗ -0.137∗ -0.132∗ -0.151∗
(0.075) (0.078) (0.078) (0.082)
Indian -0.004 0.014 0.010 0.020
(0.203) (0.203) (0.203) (0.209)
Asian -0.080 -0.086 -0.083 -0.096
(0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.078)
Rank UG Uni. -0.007 -0.007 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Rank Law School -0.011 -0.011 -0.019
(0.020) (0.021) (0.023)
Rank in LS Class -0.090∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029)
Job Offers 0.004 0.003 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Debt after LS -0.002 -0.002 -0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Married 0.024 -0.006
(0.045) (0.047)
No. Children -0.006 -0.000
(0.035) (0.036)
Child Aged ¡4 0.004 0.011
(0.088) (0.090)
Constant 0.541∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗∗ 1.297∗∗∗ 1.286∗∗∗ 0.772
(0.026) (0.141) (0.216) (0.219) (0.511)
Observations 680 679 679 679 679
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.022 0.042 0.038 0.044
Note:* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level.
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Table A2: Aspiration gaps
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Career Asp. Career Asp. Career Asp. Career Asp. Career Asp.
Female -1.699∗∗∗ -1.642∗∗∗ -1.614∗∗∗ -1.524∗∗∗ -1.586∗∗∗
(0.245) (0.248) (0.249) (0.251) (0.254)
Age 0.002 -0.014 -0.042 -0.023
(0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032)
Black -1.025∗ -0.956∗ -0.953∗ -0.912
(0.542) (0.549) (0.552) (0.564)
Hispanic -0.792 -0.834∗ -0.817 -0.693
(0.483) (0.498) (0.502) (0.516)
Indian -1.094 -0.781 -0.709 0.115
(1.304) (1.302) (1.301) (1.317)
Asian -0.258 -0.320 -0.325 -0.135
(0.478) (0.480) (0.481) (0.489)
Rank UG Uni. -0.018 -0.018 -0.004
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
Rank Law School -0.411∗∗∗ -0.383∗∗∗ -0.361∗∗
(0.131) (0.132) (0.143)
Rank in LS Class -0.194 -0.135 -0.033
(0.174) (0.176) (0.185)
Job Offers 0.136∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.054)
Debt after LS 0.046 0.041 0.032
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
Married 0.077 0.039
(0.289) (0.295)
No. Children 0.329 0.356
(0.225) (0.229)
Child Aged ¡4 0.352 0.373
(0.562) (0.570)
Constant 7.366∗∗∗ 7.402∗∗∗ 10.202∗∗∗ 10.521∗∗∗ 5.548∗
(0.164) (0.905) (1.387) (1.403) (3.218)
Observations 680 679 679 679 679
Adjusted R2 0.065 0.067 0.084 0.088 0.120
Note:* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level.
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Table A3: Comments and Mentoring
(1) (2)
Comments Senior Mentor
Female 0.165∗∗∗ -0.010
(0.031) (0.037)
Age -0.000 -0.003
(0.004) (0.005)
Black 0.045 -0.054
(0.063) (0.082)
Hispanic 0.115∗ 0.037
(0.060) (0.075)
Indian 0.219 0.234
(0.146) (0.192)
Asian -0.012 -0.056
(0.055) (0.071)
Rank UG Uni. -0.003 0.009
(0.005) (0.006)
Rank Law School 0.014 -0.023
(0.016) (0.021)
Rank in LS Class -0.011 -0.030
(0.021) (0.027)
Job Offers -0.009 0.006
(0.006) (0.008)
Debt after LS 0.012∗ -0.002
(0.007) (0.008)
Married 0.003 0.054
(0.033) (0.043)
No. Children -0.009 -0.002
(0.026) (0.033)
Child Aged ¡4 -0.056 -0.088
(0.064) (0.083)
Constant -0.183 -0.033
(0.304) (0.470)
Observations 570 679
Adjusted R2 0.077 0.088
Note:* denotes significance at the 10% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and *** denotes
significance at the 1% level.
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10 Appendix A2
10.1 Model
We remind the reader of the main elements of the model described in Section 4.
Consider a lawyer at the start of her career. Let z ∈ (0,+∞) be a continuous outcome variable that
represents how successful the lawyer is later on in her career. For instance, imagine z as a composite index
of the salary, position and firm where the lawyer works at the end of the game, i.e., at promotion time. The
lawyer has the following period utility at the end of the game (as in Genicot and Ray):
v(z) + v (max(z − a, 0))
where a represents the level of aspirations. We further assume that v(z) = γ (1− e−z), an increasing concave
function, where γ parametrizes the strength of preferences.17
The outcome z is stochastically determined. Specifically, z follows an exponential distribution of param-
eter λ, f(z) = λe−λz.
The individual can exert effort h (number of hours) to shift the distribution of z. Specifically, assume
1
λ = h at cost c(h) =
α
2 h
2, so that higher effort increases the expected outcome.
The timing of the game is the following:
• Period 0: aspirations a are determined.
• Period 1: the individual chooses the level of effort, denoted h for number of hours.
• Period 2: z is realized.
We assume that the player has a present bias. Specifically we assume that she has beta-delta preferences,
with δ = 1 and β < 1.
In period 0, we will distinguish two different cases, one where aspirations are exogenously given to the
player and one where they are endogenously chosen by her.
10.2 Proofs
We now derive the proofs of our main results. We begin by deriving a formulation for the expected utility.
17This choice of preferences keeps the analysis tractable, but the results naturally extend to more general
preferences.
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Given a value of λ (i.e., holding effort fixed), the second-period utility of the individual is given by∫ a
0
γ
(
1− e−z)λe−λzdz + ∫ +∞
a
γ
(
1− e−z + 1− e−(z−a)
)
λe−λzdz
=
∫ +∞
0
γ
(
1− e−z)λe−λzdz + ∫ +∞
a
γ
(
1− e−(z−a)
)
λe−λzdz.
We have ∫ +∞
0
γ
(
1− e−z)λe−λzdz = γ 1
1 + λ
Furthermore, using the change of variables y = z − a, we have∫ +∞
a
γ
(
1− e−(z−a)
)
λe−λzdz =
∫ +∞
0
γ
(
1− e−y)λe−λ(y+a)dy = γ 1
1 + λ
e−λa
Overall, the expected utility in the second period for a given level of aspirations a can be written as:
U = γ
1
1 + λ
[
1 + e−λa
]
.
Proof of Proposition 1
Effort will be set in period 1 to maximize the expected utility, which involves an immediate cost of effort
and the utility collected in period 2 (and thus discounted by β):
βγ
1
1 + λ
[
1 + e−λa
]− α
2
h2 (1)
= βγ
h
1 + h
[
1 + e−a/h
]
− α
2
h2
The FOC of the maximization problem is given by:
βγ
1
(1 + h)2
[
1 + e−a/h
]
+ βγ
a
h2
h
1 + h
e−a/h − αh = 0
Below, we use the notation
F (a, h) = βγ
1
(1 + h)2
[
1 + e−a/h
]
+ βγ
a
h2
h
1 + h
e−a/h − αh
We have
∂F
∂h
= βγ
[
− 2
(1 + h)3
+ e−a/h
(
− 2
(1 + h)3
+
h
1 + h
a
h3
(
−2 + a
h
))]
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We can show that the second-order condition is satisfied.
∂F
∂h
< 0
The implicit function theorem implies that
∂h
∂a
= −
∂F
∂a
∂F
∂h
We have
∂F
∂a
= βγe−a/h
[
− 1
h
1
(1 + h)2
+
1
h2
h
1 + h
− a
h2
1
1 + h
]
= βγe−a/h
a
h2
1
(1 + h)2
[
h2 − a(1 + h)]
Defining a¯ = h
2
1+h , we see that
∂F
∂a > 0 if and only if a ≤ a¯. We thus obtain the result of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
The player chooses a in period 0 to maximize:
β
[
γ
h
1 + h
[
1 + e−a/h
]
− α
2
h2
]
(2)
which corresponds to expression (1) but where present bias parameter β applies both to costs of effort and
future benefits. The equilibrium level of aspirations is characterized in the following result.
Use the notation
G(a, h) = γ
h
1 + h
[
1 + e−a/h
]
− α
2
h2
The FOC with respect to a is given by:
∂G(a, h)
∂h
∂h
∂a
− γ 1
1 + h
e−a/h = 0
We have
F = β
∂G(a, h)
∂h
− (1− β)αh
Given that F = 0, we can rewrite the FOC above
(1− β)
β
αh
∂h
∂a
− γ 1
1 + h
e−a/h
For β sufficiently small, the FOC is positive at a = 0, so that the lawyer will optimally set aspirations
to be strictly positive.
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Result (1) naturally follows. The player will only set strictly positive aspirations if doing so can increase
effort levels. Thus, when aspirations are endogenously chosen, they will always be set at a value less than a¯.
We now prove result (2).
Let
H =
(1− β)
β
αh
∂h
∂a
− γ 1
1 + h
e−a/h
The equilibrium level of aspirations is implicitly defined by H = 0.
The implicit function theorem yields
∂a
∂β
= −
∂H
∂β
∂G
∂a
For an interior solution, the second-order condition applies, and thus ∂H∂a < 0. Furthermore, we have
∂H
∂β
= − 1
β2
αh
∂h
∂a
< 0.
Thus, overall a∗ is decreasing in β, i.e., more present-biased individuals (with lower β) will set higher
aspirations.
We have:
∂a
∂γ
= −
∂H
∂γ
∂G
∂a
The term ∂H∂γ is more difficult to sign since h is a function of γ. However, when β is small enough, only
the left-hand side of the expression above matters, and since both h and ∂h∂a are increasing in γ, we have
∂H
∂γ > 0. Overall, this implies that a
∗ is increasing in γ if β is small enough.
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